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Abstract:
This paper addresses possible consequences of a minimum wage in a spatial context. An
empirical analysis utilizing German data shows that a signicant spatial wage structure
exists and that, as a consequence, the share of workers earning wages below a minimum
wage will be particularly high in rural counties even if we control for educational and
occupational dierences. A theoretical analysis discusses the implications for the spatial
structure of the economy and shows that while the wages in the countryside will be aected
positively, wages will decline in the city, where employment and population rise. Workers
in the city will further suer from an increase in housing costs. This supports concerns
that urban poverty might increase as a result of the introduction of a minimum wage.
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For the policy maker minimum wages are an attractive policy tool. Minimum wages are
apparently targeted at the heart of the poverty problem, the motivation to ght poverty
earns public respect, and the direct costs involved seem low. In fact, the evidence suggests
that minimum wages do have an impact on the wage distribution raising the earnings of
those that are at the bottom of the wage distribution. Opponents argue that minimum
wages also have important adverse eects on employment. Thus, a controversial debate
about the adverse consequences of minimum wages on employment consumes a lot of space
in an empirical literature that employs sophisticated micro-level datasets and advanced
econometric techniques to show that minimum wages have or have not adverse eects on
employment (e.g. see Card and Krueger 1994, Card and Krueger 2000, Neumark and
Wascher 2000, and Brown 1999).
In this paper we argue that it is generally overlooked that wage increases and adverse
employment eects resulting from minimum wages are systematically dierent for dierent
groups of workers. This is already indicated by the experience with minimum wages in
Germany. While the minimum wage in the construction sector shows quite limited eects
in the western part of the country it exerts rather strong adverse eects in the eastern part
(e.g., Moeller and Koenig, 2008a). Moreover, given the wage dierential between East
and West, Ragnitz and Thum (2007) show that a federal minimum wage would mainly be
binding in the eastern part of the country.
It is important to note that these asymmetries are built in, however, by the same striking
simplicity of the concept that so much appeals to the policy maker: the minimum wage
simply disregards all sorts of wage structures that may exist, including not only wage
1dierences associated with skills, occupation, experience, and sex, but also dierences with
regard to industry, rm-size, and region. While the ignorance of these dierences seems to
be a necessary consequence of a social policy that is committed to combat poverty, all of
these dierences play a role in the economic consequences of minimum wages and, hence,
are important for the eectiveness of minimum wages in reducing poverty.
An important dimension of the wage structure in this regard is the spatial wage structure
that shows up in higher wages in urban agglomerations as compared to rural areas. This
paper argues that if there is a uniform minimum wage imposed on cities and rural towns
alike, we can expect that the minimum wage is much more restrictive in the countryside but
might be rather ineective for people working in the cities. Hence, the wages of workers
that live in the cities might not benet much from minimum wages. In fact, using the
German example, we present some empirical evidence below showing that the share of
workers earning wages below a minimum wage would be much higher in rural as compared
to urban areas. While this dierence might be explained by the dierent composition of
the work force, we provide further evidence that the regional dierences in the incidence
of minimum wages are mainly driven by a spatial wage structure that is associated with
dierences in density even if we control for dierences in education and occupation.
Based on these empirical ndings we explore the consequences of an introduction of a
uniform minimum wage in a stylized theoretical model that derives a spatial wage distri-
bution in a migration equilibrium setting with productivity dierences and housing costs.
The analysis shows that imposing uniform minimum wages exerts distortive eects on the
spatial structure of the economy. More specically, we nd that employment and popu-
lation will rise in the more densely populated regions implying that wages of the working
population in the cities might even fall. Moreover, the city population would also suer
2from an increase in housing costs. This asymmetric impact is important since there is a
close association between poverty and urbanization.3 Thus, our ndings support concerns
that urban poverty might increase as a result of the introduction of a uniform minimum
wage.
The paper is organized as follows. The rst part is concerned with spatial dierences in
the extent to which the minimum wage is binding. Section 2 provides some basic empirical
evidence about these spatial dierences in the incidence of minimum wages in Germany.
Section 3 provides some further evidence about the spatial wage structure that gives rise to
these systematic dierences. The second part of the paper provides a theoretical analysis of
the consequences of these spatial dierences in the incidence of minimum wages. Section
4 rst lays out a stylized theoretical model that shows how a spatial wage distribution
emerges in the migration equilibrium setting with productivity dierences and housing
costs. Subsequently, minimum wages are introduced and we discuss the consequences.
Section 5 provides our conclusions.
2 Spatial Dierences in the Incidence of Minimum
Wages
There is an ongoing political debate in Germany about the economy-wide introduction
of minimum wages. In 1997 a minimum wage of DM 16 (e 8.18) for West Germany
(DM 15.14 (e 7.74) for East Germany) has been introduced in the construction sector
3In the German case the poverty rate in the cities is almost twice as large as the poverty rate of rural
counties: in 2004, the poverty rate in core cities has been 5.11% compared with a gure of rural counties
of 2.89% (Source: German States' Statistical Oces).
3(see K onig and M oller 2008b). Current political proposals for the uniform minimum wage
by some of the unions and by the Social-Democratic Party point at levels of e 6.50 or
even e 7.50. In the following, we investigate the spatial patterns of the incidence of an
introduction of corresponding minimum wages for the case of Germany.
We make use of the regional sample of employees (Besch aftigtenstichprobe) of the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB), which constitutes a two percent random sample of all
German employees subject to social security contributions and provides gures on employ-
ment status, wages, and personal characteristics like age, education, and profession of the
sampled individuals (for a detailed description of the data see Drews, 2008). Since the
data refer to the place of work at the county level,4 this dataset is well suited to provide
evidence on the spatial structure of wages in Germany. For our purpose of illustrating
possible spatial consequences of minimum wages we focus only on the latest year available,
2004. Furthermore, we include only full-time employed individuals aged between 16 and
62.5
Figure 1 illustrates the spatial dierences in the minimum wage incidence, i.e. the average
percentage of employees aected by a minimum wage at the level of counties and cities
for West Germany and East Germany, respectively. Note that we include the top-coded
observations when drawing percentiles from the wage distribution. As our data refer to
daily wages but not to hourly wages and no information is provided about hours of work, we
4For reasons of privacy protection, some counties are aggregated into a region.
5Due to changes in individual employment status, employer, etc., for some of the sampled individuals
several, possibly also simultaneous, spells are reported within one year, with the wage level possibly diering
among dierent spells. In order not to overstate the incidence of a minimum wage in Germany, we include
the highest respective wage reported for each individual worker in our analysis. To check for possible
problems with simultaneous spells we conducted alternative analyses excluding all observations with a
daily wage below e 40 to ensure that the results are not driven by such possibly defective observations.
However, all results are unaected qualitatively, and even quantitatively only minor changes were found.
4rely on a percentile of the wage distribution for full employed workers rather than directly
applying a minimum wage. More specically we rely on the analysis of Ragnitz and Thum
(2007) who found that a minimum wage of e 6.50 (7.50) corresponds to the 8.50 (11.30)
percentile of the wage distribution in West Germany and to the 18.10 (26.00) percentile in
East Germany. Ragnitz and Thum are using microdata from the survey on the salary and
wage structure in the manufacturing and service sectors that have been issued by Federal
Statistical Oce in 2007. While this data refers to 2001 our analysis focuses on 2004.
Since the wage distribution might have changed over time, more recent data might result
in dierent percentiles. However, our focus is not so much on the actual share of workers
with wages below a minimum wage of e 6.50 or e7.50. Rather we are interested in the
spatial dierences in the minimum wage incidence, regardless of the actual level.
A rst inspection seems to conrm that some of the cities, like Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne,
or Munich, are visibly less aected by a minimum wage of e 7.50 than their less densely
populated neighbor regions. Further visualization of the spatial dimension of the minimum
wage incidence is provided by Figure 2 which shows the average population density and
the average percentage of employees aected by a minimum wage for ve county types.
The classication of county types is based on the typology given by the Federal Bureau of
Regional Planning (Bundesamt f ur Bauwesen und Raumordnung).6 Clearly, the share of
employees that earn less than the minimum wage is higher, the less densely populated the
respective county is. The highest share is found for rural counties where more than 20 %
6We modify the existing classication such that counties are classied according to their own charac-
teristics, ignoring the dimension of the general level of agglomeration of their surrounding area, that is
contained in the original classication. More precisely, our county type 1 comprises cities with more than
100 000 inhabitants, county type 2 captures all counties with density above 300 inhabitants per sqkm.
County type 3 refers to all counties with density above 150 but below 300 inhabitants per sqkm. County
type 4 refers to all counties with density below 150 inhabitants per sqkm. County type 5 nally captures
rural counties with density below 100 inhabitants per sqkm.
5Figure 1: Incidence of Minimum Wages
Percentage of employment spells with a wage below e 7.50 in East and West Germany.
6Figure 2: Incidence of Minimum Wages by County Type
Percentage of employment spells aected by a minimum wage of e 6.50 (e 7.50) and log of density by
county type.
of employees would be subject to a minimum wage of e 7.50.
The visual impression is further underpinned by means of regression analysis, where we
estimate the relationship between the local minimum wage incidence and the degree of
agglomeration. More precisely, the regressions take the form
MWj = 0 + 1Zj + "j;
where MWj denotes the percentage of employees aected by the respective minimum wage
at location j, and Zj is a vector of attributes reecting the degree of agglomeration of
7region j.
Summary statistics of all variables employed in this study are reported in Table 1. Table 2
reports the results. The rst set of regressions, reported in columns (1) and (2), conrms a
highly signicant negative relationship between the log of the population density and the
percentage of workers aected by the minimum wage restriction. Doubling density would be
associated with a decrease of the minimum wage incidence by about 1.68 (2.41) percentage
points for the e 6.50 (e 7.50) example. In our second set of regressions (columns (3) and
(4)), we replace the density by dummy variables indicating the respective county type. The
results clearly show that the minimum wage incidence is higher in less densely populated
counties: the rural counties are having the highest coecient indicating that the share of
workers aected by a minimum wage is higher by about 6.19 (8.93) percentage points in
rural counties as compared to cities.
Columns (5) and (6) provide results that include a dummy variable for counties in East
Germany. It shows a strong positive eect conrming the results by Ragnitz and Thum
(2007). Of course, since there is a clear dierence in terms of population size and density
between regions in East and West this dummy captures some part of the spatial variation in
density. This explains why the inclusion of this dummy is associated with smaller density
eects. However, the qualitative results prove robust. As compared to the cities the share
of employees with wages below the minimum wage is up to 2.7 (3.9) percentage points
higher in rural counties.
8Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Individual Data
Daily wage 327130 83.1 33.7 1 167
Sex (is 1 for male) 353047 .641 .480 0 1
Age 353047 40.3 10.6 16 62
Edu.: No 353047 .131 .338 0 1
Edu.: Elementary school 353047 .687 .464 0 1
Edu.: High school 353047 .011 .103 0 1
Edu.: High school w. prof. training 353047 .053 .224 0 1
Edu.: College degree 353047 .045 .207 0 1
Edu.: University degree 353047 .074 .262 0 1
Prof. status: Simple Laborer 353047 .202 .402 0 1
Prof. status: Skilled 353047 .239 .427 0 1
Prof. status: Foreman 353047 .017 .128 0 1
Prof. status: Employee 353047 .543 .498 0 1
Prof. status: Home worker 353047 .000 .019 0 1
Regional Data
East 435 .257 .438 0 1
Population density 435 502.4 654.1 40.0 4010
MW incidence in %, e 6.50 435 12.1 6.62 4.08 56.1
MW incidence in %, e 7.50 435 16.4 8.61 5.08 61.3
Cty. type 1: Cities 435 .163 .370 0 1
Cty. type 2: Urban 435 .101 .302 0 1
Cty. type 3: Densely 435 .299 .458 0 1
Cty. type 4: Densely, rural 435 .340 .474 0 1
Cty. type 5: Rural 435 .097 .296 0 1
Sources: IAB Besch aftigtenstichprobe 2004, federal and regional statistical oces, and own


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































103 The Spatial Wage Structure in Germany
The descriptive evidence provided so far has not touched upon the issue of what is driving
the wage dierences that are behind the spatial dierences in the incidence of minimum
wages. Yet this is important for the economic consequences of minimum wages. If higher
wages are the result of a spatial structure in the wages, such that wages in densely popu-
lated areas are systematically higher, the imposition of the minimum wage might distort
the spatial wage structure with consequences for the spatial allocation of production. If,
however, higher wages in the cities simply arise from dierences in the composition of the
labor force in terms of skill and occupation, the economic consequences might be rather
dierent. Therefore, this section further explores the sources of the observed spatial dif-
ferences in the wages.
As is discussed in the regional and urban economics literature, dierences in productivity
give rise to dierences in the intensity of land use which is most strikingly reected in
population density. As the largest density is generally observed in urban agglomerations,
the discussion about the spatial wage structure is centered around the so-called urban wage
premium, i.e. the notion that wages tend to be higher in densely populated areas, and,
in particular, in the cities. While there is much discussion on the determinants of the
urban wage premium, its existence is conrmed by many empirical studies (e.g., Glaeser
and Mare, 2001, for Germany see Lehmer and M oller, 2007).
In order to obtain quantitative estimates of the spatial wage structure in Germany, we run
regressions relating the log of individual daily earnings to dierent measures of agglomera-
tion, thereby controlling for individual characteristics. These Mincer-type wage regressions
11take the form
lnwk;j = 0 + 1Xk;j + 2Zj + "k;j;
where wk;j denotes the wage of individual k in location j, Xk;j is a vector of personal
characteristics of this individual, and Zj is a vector of regional attributes reecting the
degree of agglomeration of region j.7
While the dataset is quite rich, a problem with the data is that the wage gures are
top coded at the upper social security threshold. We employ two dierent estimation
strategies to deal with this problem. First, we estimate a tobit model. As is well known,
the basic tobit model relies on rather strong assumptions and suers from inconsistency
under conditions of heteroskedasticity. However, with increasing age the individual wages
might well display a larger variance, since the job experience and the employment record
will be more dierent within groups of older workers. Similarly, workers with higher levels
of education might display a larger variance in wages (e.g., Martinsa and Pereira, 2004).
We, therefore, employ a heteroskedastic tobit-model where we associate dierences in the
conditional variance of wages with the age and education level of the individuals.
In a second approach we focus on the median of wages which is less aected by the top-
coding of the wages. We adopt a two-step procedure to censored quantile regressions
suggested by Chamberlain (1994) and applied to regional data by Buettner and Fitzen-
berger (2001). In a rst step, we group the data by cells of workers with the same education
and the same age, and where employment takes place in the same district. For each cell
7Note that this wage regression is concerned with the cross-section. As the dataset used is a panel
dataset that provides information also about earlier years, one might control for all individual dierences
using panel data techniques. Since we are concerned with a cross-sectional issue, this would require to
focus on workers that have moved between counties of dierent types. An analysis along these lines is,
however, beyond the scope of the current paper.
12the median wage is determined. In a second step, all uncensored cell medians are regressed
on cell characteristics such as the population density.
Table 3 reports the results of dierent specications using the Tobit approach to the mean
wage.8 In column (1), we report a very basic regression of the log of daily earnings,
controlling only for gender and age structure. The inclusion of the log of population
density in column (2) yields an increase in the goodness of t and the signicant coecient
conrms a positive relationship between wage level and agglomeration. To be precise, we
nd that doubling population density is associated with a 8.7 percentage increase in wages.
In column (3) we replace the density variable by several dummy variables capturing the
county type of the individual's working place. The results conrm a spatial structure and
show that the wage in rural counties is lower by about 31.2 percent.
In columns (4) to (7) we include controls for education and occupation. All coecients on
individual attributes are statistically highly signicant and show the expected signs, except
for the indicator of high-school graduation that does not seem to provide much information
once it is controlled for high-school graduates with further professional education. Column
(5) includes the log of population density. With all other coecients remaining remarkably
constant, the density again shows a signicant positive association with the wage level.
Note, however, that the coecient obtained after controlling for skill and occupation is
slightly smaller, indicating that a part of the density eect is captured by the composition
of the labor force. In column (6) we again replace the density by dummy variables for the
county type. While the urban counties are statistically not distinguishable from the omitted
category (cities), the other three indicators of county categories are each signicantly and
inversely associated with the wage level. Note that when ignoring cities, a category that is
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14based on the administrative status and the population size, the size of coecients decreases
with the density, conrming a monotonous relationship between density and the level of
earnings. For rural counties we nd that wages tend to be lower by 23.2 percent.
As reported in column (7), when accounting for structural dierences between eastern and
western Germany by means of a dummy variable we get similar results. While the size of
the eects are smaller, the qualitative results prove robust: for rural counties we still nd
that wages are lower on average by about 10 percent.
Table 4 provides results for the median wage among the cells of workers with the same
education, age, and district. We obtain a number of 3863 uncensored cells with an average
cell size of about 88 observations. At least when considering specications that include
controls for skills and occupation (column (4) to (7)) the results with regard to density
and county type are remarkably similar to the above Tobit results. The wage dieren-
tial between cities and rural counties is estimated to be on average 20.5 or 11.8 percent
depending on whether a dummy for the eastern part of Germany is included.
Having shown that not only the absolute wage distribution shows marked spatial dier-
ences but also the conditional wage distribution obtained after controlling for skills and
occupation, let us come back to the question of the spatial incidence of the minimum wage.
The signicance of the density variable or the county types in a wage regression that in-
cludes controls for education and occupation, indicates that there is a spatial structure
that is not simply driven by composition eects: the same worker tends to earn more if
employed in a more urbanized region. As a consequence, the probability to earn a wage
rate that is below the minimum wage will be signicantly higher in rural regions. To get
an impression of the empirical magnitudes involved, we can use our estimates to obtain a





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Based on the results presented in column (6) of Table 3, assuming a log-normal wage
distribution for a simple laborer without completed schooling and with mean age,9 we
obtain an estimate of the probability to earn a wage below a minimum wage of e 6.50 of
34 %. According to column (6), the wage dierential between a city and a rural county
is about -.232 percent. Given this substantial rural-urban wage gap, in a rural county the
probability for the same type of worker to earn a wage below the minimum wage of e 6.50
is estimated to be no less than 51%. Accordingly, the probability to earn a wage below the
minimum wage is larger in a rural county by 17 percentage points for this unskilled type of
worker. However, column (7) which includes a dummy for East Germany obtains a smaller
urban-rural wage gap of about -.100. Doing the same calculation for this specication, 10
we nd that the probability to earn a wage below the minimum wage is larger in a rural
county by 7.2 percentage points.
While controlling for composition eects, these estimates point at even stronger dierences
in the minimum wage incidence between urban and rural counties. Thus, the inverse
relationship between urbanization and minimum wage incidence is conrmed.
4 Minimum Wages in Spatial Equilibrium
In order to discuss the consequences of minimum wages in the presence of a spatial wage
structure, we start with outlining a theoretical model of the spatial equilibrium without
minimum wages. We, then, introduce a minimum wage into this setting, and, nally,
discuss the associated welfare implications.
9The associated standard deviation of the log of the wages is estimated with  = :537.
10The associated standard deviation of the log of the wages is estimated with  = :528.
174.1 A Basic Model of the Spatial Equilibrium
Consider an economy with M regions, i = 1;2;:::;N. Region i hosts ni identical households.
Each of these households supplies one unit of (homogenous) labor and, thus, the total
labor supply in region i is equal to the population size ni. All labor is employed by
local rms according to a production function Fi(ni); with
@Fi
@ni > 0 and
@2Fi
@n2
i < 0. Note
that the production function is indexed with i in order to allow for possible dierences in
productivity. Denoting the wage rate in region i with wi optimal employment obeys
Fin (ni) = wi:
To derive labor supply in spatial equilibrium, let us assume that the representative worker
household in region i enjoys utility from the consumption of a private good in the amount
of xi and of housing space in the amount of qi:
ui = ~ u(xi;qi):
To keep the analysis simple let us assume that each household consumes a xed amount
of housing qi = 1 and we can simplify the utility function
ui = ~ u(xi;1) = u(xi):
Each region hosts one city that serves as center of production and is the place of residence
for the mobile population. Let us employ a standard monocentric city model (see Fujita,
1989). Production takes place in the central business district, which is surrounded by the
residential district. Consider a household located at the urban fringe which is in distance
18b to the city center. This household has commuting costs of kb and direct housing costs
corresponding to the opportunity cost of land . Since dierences in the direct cost of
housing within the city would only capture dierences in the commuting costs, we know
that the total cost of housing, i.e. direct housing costs plus commuting costs, is equal within
the city. However, the total cost of housing might vary across cities if the population size






where Ti () captures the available housing space at distance  from the city center. Hence,
the distance from the urban fringe to the city center is an increasing function of the total
population size bi = b(ni) with some positive elasticity.11 As a consequence, the total cost
of housing in the city is
hi  h(ni) =  + kb(ni);
which is increasing in population size.
Note that a larger population size implies a larger city, and, hence, the higher total housing
costs reect a larger location rent in the city center. As the urban area in the region
increases we can also say that density is increasing with population size.12
Under conditions of household mobility, utility is equalized across locations such that the
level of consumption is the same
u(xi) = u(x):
11A positive elasticity is obtained, for instance, in the simple case of a circular city with Ti () = 2.
In this case the elasticity of bi with respect to ni is 0.5.
12Of course, a more elaborate model of the spatial structure would include investment in structures such
that density even increases within the city.
19For simplicity, we abstract from other sources of income and assume that mobile house-
holds only earn income from labor. Thus, we assume that households derive income from
supplying one unit of labor to local production at a competitively determined wage. Since,
however, housing costs may dier between cities, we can derive a labor supply function
indicating the number of people that are willing to work and live in the city at a specic
wage rate:
wi = x + h(ni)
Given the properties of the total housing cost function, note that the equilibrium wage
rate is increasing in population size.
Labor market equilibrium in region i is graphically depicted in Figure 3. The labor supply
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curve shows a positive slope that, as we have seen, results from the increase in the total
20housing costs. Note that the position of the labor supply curve depends on the level of
consumption xi. At higher levels of consumption and, thus, at higher levels of utility, the
supply curve shifts upward. The labor demand curve, however, shows the usual negative
slope. At the intersection point labor demand is consistent with the supply decision of
the households and we obtain the equilibrium level of the corresponding wage rate and of
employment which is equivalent to population in our model.
Suppose that total factor productivity is subject to region-specic productivity dierences,
and let us introduce a parameter i that shifts productivity according to Fi (ni) = i ~ F (ni).
If i > j, region i has a higher productivity such that Fin > Fjn at the same level of
population. As a consequence, the population in i will be higher (ni > nj). To see why,
note that if population would be the same (nj = ni) also housing costs would be equal.
Hence, private consumption would have to be higher xi > xj. With more consumption xi
and the same housing costs, however, utility would be higher in i such that the migration
equilibrium is disturbed. Hence, the population size in region i would have to be larger.
The additional labor supply would result in a decline in the marginal productivity of labor
and in higher total cost of housing until utility is equalized across regions. Since housing
costs are increasing with population size, and since wages will compensate cost dierences
between regions, wages will dier in spatial equilibrium wi > wj:
Thus, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (City Size and Spatial Wage Structure)
In the migration equilibrium where utility is equal across regions, locations with higher
productivity display a larger population size, a larger urban area, and higher wages.
Graphically, as displayed in Figure 4 an increase in productivity in region i relative to
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region j will result in a dierent labor demand curve that shows higher wages at the same
level of employment. Since in the spatial equilibrium utility and, thus, consumption is
equalized across regions, both regions face the same supply curve. As a consequence, the
high productivity region will be larger in terms of population and display a higher wage
rate than the other.
4.2 Introducing a Minimum Wage
Now let us consider an economy with several regions, which dier in productivity. Let us
rank regions by size n1 > n2 > :::: > nM. Our analysis implies, so far, that the wage rate
will dier in the sense that the region with the higher productivity displays a higher wage
22rate such that w1 > w2 > :::: > wM. Let us introduce a minimum wage w such that the
wage rate of, say, region i is higher, whereas the wage rate in region j = i+1 is lower. To see
how this aects the spatial distribution of activities, consider rst the lower-productivity
region where w > wj. We can see immediately, that for the marginal product of labor to
rise, employment will have to decline. Without mobility we would obtain unemployment.
With mobility, however, labor will move to more productive regions where the minimum
wage is not binding and, hence, employment can be increased. As a consequence, both
employment and population decline in the low productivity region.
The consequences of the introduction of a uniform minimum wage are illustrated in Figure
5. The initial equilibrium is characterized by levels of employment ni and nj and in both
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regions utility is at the same level.
23With the introduction of the minimum wage, labor market equilibrium in region j requires
a decline in employment to a level n0
j, and with higher wages and smaller housing costs
there is an increase of utility in the low productivity region. The high productivity region
experiences an increase in employment as well as a decline in wages as marginal productivity
declines, and hence, utility decreases. However, migration cannot restore equilibrium since
employment cannot be increased at the minimum wage in the low productivity region.
Also for the more general case with M regions we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Agglomeration Eect of the Minimum Wage)
Imposing a minimum wage that is binding somewhere within the spatial wage distribution
distorts the locational equilibrium such that the population of densely populated regions rises
whereas the population of sparsely populated regions declines.
Proof: Given labor mobility the consumption level earned by workers in dierent regions
is equalized. Taking account of the labor demand equation this implies
Fin (ni)   h(ni) = Fjn (nj)   h(nj):
Suppose that region j is less productive such that nj < ni. Imposing a minimum wage








With this constraint the model is overdetermined and, hence, the population size of region
j is no longer determined by the above spatial equilibrium. However, in all regions where
the minimum wage is binding, labor productivity is forced to rise implying that labor
24demand declines. With the total population size given, employment and population size
in the unconstrained regions will expand.
Further results can be obtained with regard to spatial price dierences. First consider
wages. Intuitively, the spatial wage distribution is compressed. To see this, recall that the
minimum wage is more likely to bind in the low productivity regions that display lower
wages. At the same time, however, the wage level in the more productive regions declines
since employment is increased.
Proposition 2 (Spatial Wage Distribution Eect of the Minimum Wage)
Imposing a minimum wage that is binding somewhere within the spatial wage distribution
tends to compress the spatial wage structure.
Proof: We know from Proposition 1, that all regions where the minimum wage is not
binding face an employment increase. All regions where the minimum wage is binding
experience a decline in employment. Hence, the marginal productivity is increasing in all
regions where the wage rate is below the minimum wage, whereas it declines in all regions
above the minimum wage. As a consequence, wages in the latter group decline, whereas
wages in the former group increase.
With regard to housing costs a dierent result is obtained. Due to the agglomeration
eect, we have a larger demand for space in the large regions that are unconstrained and
a reduction of the demand for space in the smaller, constrained regions. Let us state this
as our third proposition.
Proposition 3 (Location Rent Eect of the Minimum Wage)
Imposing a minimum wage that is binding somewhere within the spatial wage distribution
25tends to raise total housing costs and location rent in the more densely populated regions
and to reduce total housing costs and location rent in the less densely populated regions.
Proof: We know from Proposition 1, that all regions where the minimum wage is not
binding face an increase in population. All regions where the minimum wage is binding,
experience a decline in population. Hence, the total housing costs are increasing in the
rst group but decreasing in the latter.
4.3 Welfare Implications
It is tempting to consider welfare implications. We have one group of workers that expe-
rience higher wages at lower housing costs. For this group utility rises. A second group of
workers in the high productivity regions experience a utility decline since wages fall and
housing costs rise. A third group of workers that leave region j;:::;M and move to regions
1;:::;i also experience a decline in utility. In fact, since utility is equalized across regions
in the initial equilibrium, and will still be equalized across regions 1;:::;i where wages are
above the minimum wage, the decline in utility experienced by the second and third groups
of workers will be the same. Can we say that the gain of the one group with an increase
in utility outweigh the losses of the other two groups? In order to address this question
it is useful to discuss the eciency properties of the spatial equilibrium with and without
minimum wages. A standard way to approach this issue is to invoke a central planner that
aims at maximizing the utility of a representative worker household in jurisdiction i under
the spatial equilibrium constraint that worker utility is equalized across jurisdictions.
L
















The rst set of constraints require that worker utility is equalized across regions { they
may be referred to as mobility constraints. The second set of constraints capture the
budget constraints for the households requiring that the sum of a region's households'
consumption and total housing costs is equal to the total income in this region. The last
constraint simply states that the total population is xed. The ecient spatial allocation
of labor is obtained from the rst order condition with regard to the population size.
@Lcp
@ni
= (Fin   xi   hi   hinni)   ' = 0:
Taking account of the mobility constraints we derive the locational eciency condition
(Wildasin, 1986)
Fin (ni)   h(ni)   hn (ni)ni = Fjn (nj)   h(nj)   hn (nj)nj;
implying that a reallocation of labor cannot increase output net of housing costs.
Note that there is a discrepancy between the central planner's allocation and the above
migration equilibrium even without the imposition of minimum wages. This is caused
by the crowding eect that arises through the impact of population changes on the total
housing costs. Intuitively, when moving from one region to the other the household ignores
the crowding eect. Therefore, the laissez faire migration equilibrium turns out to be not
ecient in our model. However, the imposition of the minimum wage does not improve
this situation.
27To see this, consider the crowding eect hn (ni)ni and note that it is positive and increasing
in ni. Hence, this term tends to be larger in the larger region. Compared with the basic
spatial equilibrium, the marginal productivity in the larger region is too low - in the
smaller region it is too high. Therefore, we know that the ecient allocation of labor and
population would be such that employment and population are smaller in region i. Thus,






However, with minimum wages, we know that we have an increase in agglomeration relative
to the spatial equilibrium distribution, ni > ni and nj < nj. Hence




j > nj > nj:
Thus, we can say that if there is an inecient spatial equilibrium with excessive agglom-
eration, due to crowding eects, the imposition of minimum wages would give a further
push towards excessive agglomeration.
Therefore, there is no possibility for a Pareto improvement, the group of workers that
benets from minimum wages cannot compensate the others.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed consequences of uniform minimum wages for the spatial
structure of the economy. The starting point is the notion that a minimum wage is much
more restrictive in the countryside but might be rather ineective for people working in
28the cities.
An empirical analysis exploiting German data shows that a uniform minimum wage would
aect the regional labor markets quite dierently. In particular, we nd that the share of
workers that will be directly aected by the minimum wage is higher in rural counties as
compared to cities and urban counties. While this supports concerns that the minimum
wage is more eective in the rural as compared to urban areas, the economic consequences
depend on the nature of the urban-rural wage dierences. A further empirical analysis,
however, shows that the wage dierences are mainly associated with systematic spatial
dierences in the wages. Thus, the dierences in the incidence of the minimum wage are
driven by the spatial wage structure. According to our estimates, and based on some
simplifying assumptions, for a simple laborer without completed schooling and with mean
age the probability to earn a wage below the minimum wage is larger in a rural county by
17 percentage points as compared to a city or urban county.
To explore the consequences of the spatial dierences in the incidence of minimum wages,
we present a spatial equilibrium model of the labor market, where wage dierences occur
due to productivity dierences and housing costs. Imposing uniform minimum wages in
this setting exerts some distortive eects on the spatial structure of the economy. While
the wages in the countryside will tend to rise, wages would decline in the city, where
employment and population increase. Workers in cities will further suer from an increase
in housing costs. Thus, a federal minimum wage will tend to spur rural-urban migration
and might raise rather than reduce urban poverty.
Having discussed the spatial implications of minimum wages in a rather straightforward
model of the spatial equilibrium, let us briey talk about possible limitations and exten-
sions. A rst issue is the possible existence of federal welfare programs. Such programmes
29would exert similar eects as minimum wages if they dene a uniform reservation wage.
Whether or not this is the case in Germany is not obvious, however. While the subsidies
according to SGB II are, in fact, uniform, the large housing subsidy programme cate-
gorizes the cities and municipalities and assigns higher subsidies to households in urban
agglomerations.
A second important issue is the role of wage bargaining. In Germany wage bargaining
leads to sector-specic agreements dening wage oors that are uniform across several
regions. This kind of agreements may exert similar eects on the spatial wage structure.
However, wage bargaining is much less restrictive as it does not apply to all rms and shows
some limited regional dierences (Buettner, 1999). Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that
these agreements might have already contributed to some excess agglomeration eect in
Germany.
Finally, we should note that the spatial wage structure is only one example of wage struc-
tures that are disregarded by a uniform minimum wage. With other types of systematic
wage dierences such as the rm-size wage distribution, similar problems will arise. Since
a uniform minimum wage is more binding for smaller rms, it would distort the rm-size
distribution, and in a competitive setting would benet capital owners of larger rms, in
the same way as the distortion of the spatial wage structure emphasized in this paper
benets land owners in cities.
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